Nine out of nine exit polls have predicted an outright  victory for the BJP with close to 300 seats. This prediction flies in the face of prepoll opinion surveys which had concluded that the BJP would do better than its opponents hoped, but would not come near an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha. It  also dismisses the profound discontent of the electorate  — of farmers over the deepening agricultural crisis, youth over the complete absence of jobs,  workers over the loss of existing jobs,  and small manufacturers and traders forced into bankruptcy  by a combination of industrial stagnation, demonetisation, and the GST.

Can Modi’s single plank election appeal to hyper- nationalism, attacking Pakistan,  killing Kashmiri militant youth  and terrorising Indian Muslims have been sufficient  to overcome  this extensively documented collapse of confidence? If the exit polls are even close to accurate, then this would have to be the only explanation.. But can we believe the  exit polls?  Have they been accurate in the past?  The answer is that some exit polls have been reasonably accurate; others have been  wrong but within acceptable limits, while still others have been wildly wrong.  A closer examination of  past exit polls is therefore necessary to determine which category he current predictions are likely to fall into.

Let us start with past Lok Sabha polls:  In the 2004  elections pollsters gave the Vajpayee-led NDA 230 to275 seats. But it  won only 187 seats and was pushed out of power. The 2009 exit polls they gave the UPA 199 seats and doubted whether it could stay in power. Instead it got 262 seats and did. In the 2014 elections, however, the exit poll preditions were  borne out..

Since these results give a very mixed picture  lets look at exit poll predictions for Vidhan Sabhaelections. In the 2015  Bihar elections the pollsters had predicted that the BJP would get between 93 and 155 seats with a median prediction of 108 seats, and comfortably form the government.  Instead they won a mere 53 seats. Similarly, in the UP 2017 vidhan sabha elections the exit polls gave the BJP 161 to 170 seats and 228 to 230 seats to the SP and BSP combined. In fact the BJP won a spectacular 312 seats.

By contrast,  in Karnataka 2018 the exit pollsters got it almost right, for the average of their estimates, the so-called ‘poll of polls’, gave the Congress 80 seats, the BJP 104, and the Janata Dal ( secular) of Deve Gowda  38 seats, In practice the Congress got 86, the BJP 103 and the JD(S)  37.

Similarly in the three other major state elections in 2018, the exit polls got it more or less right in two , but spectacularly wrong in the third: in Madhya Pradesh 6 exit polls gave widely varying estimates for the two main parties, but their average came close to the mark. This was 111 for the Congress and 108 for the BJP. In Rajasthan  they predicted 108 for the Congress which ended with 110. But in Chhattisgarh, exit polls predicted 40 for the BJP and 44 for the Congress, but the BJP won only 15 seats while the Congress won 68.

What can we learn from these results that will help us to make sense of the exit poll results described above? It needs to be remembered that the essential premise of an exit poll is that the people tell the truth when they come out of the polling booth, because once they have  voted they have nothing to gain from hiding their choice. This, of course, is never entirely true, so opinion polls taken at leisure try to filter out a ‘lying factor’ by asking intersecting  questions. But there is no time for this in an exit poll. So the accuracy of answers hinges entirely upon the respondents’ sense of security.

This is highest when conditions are “ normal”, the rule of law more or less prevails, and the conventions of democracy are respected. These conditions usually exist  when the state or country enjoys a stable party system in which both or all parties have been in and out of power several times and do not fear being voted out. In the polls described above Rajasthan , Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka meet these pre-conditions.

A second condition in which people are likely to speak the truth is when  there is an overwhelming popular consensus on issues. Respondents then draw their sense of security from being part of a large group.  This pre-condition was fulfilled before the Lok Sabha elections of 2014  by Modi’s promises of reviving growth and creating two core jobs a year. With ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ behind him, and  a benign party and prime minister who did not target political opponents, people had no hesitation in talking about how they have voted.

A third pre-condition  for exit poll accuracy is that no new factor of compelling importance should have come into play, that disturbs the equilibrium described above. The Bihar 2015 predictions went wrong because exit pollsters were unable to take fully into account the impact of the formation of the Mahagatbandhanin the state, when converting votes  into seats. This is the single biggest stumbling block in predicting the results of any election based upon the simple majority voting system.

The pollsters got UP wrong for the same reason – they were unable to take the impact of the division of the vote between the SP and BSP fully into account while converting votes into seats. That bitter fight,  and the way it divided the Muslim vote while consolidating the upper caste hindu vote turned the exit poll results into a farce.  The results showed that the BSP-SP vote division had given the BJP 228 out of its 312 seats.

The SP had won all the  18 bye-elections in the state before the 2017 vidhan sabha poll, because the BSP had not fielded a candidate. As a result five sixths of the BSP vote had gone to the Samajwadi party. In this election if the BSP and SP have retained their shares of the 2017 vote, their combination alone will cost the BJP 46 out of its present 73 seats.

The other new factor that the pollsters have not even remotely taken into account  is the way in which Modi’s policies have unintentionally, but rapidly,  sharpened the class division in Indian politics to the point where the politics of caste and creed is gradually being transformed ito the politics of class.  It is not just that  industry has stalled and  jobs have been lost by the million when Modi had promised the opposite.   It is that every law passed by his government, and every bit of rope he has given to the VHP and other outcroppings of the RSS to enforce enactments such as the ban on cow slaughter; the unleashing of Gau Rakshaksupon cattle traders;  the invasion by aged cattle of the already crisis-ridden farmers’ fields;  the collapse of the cattle market, which has destroyed the prime mode of saving of the landless poor, and the systemic oppression and lynching of Muslims has brought in class into Indian politics in a way that could barely have been imagined five years ago.

All the economically and politically oppressed  in the country are poor. All of them are, to varying degrees, living lives of fear. Therefore very few of them are willing to tell the truth about how will they vote to strangers. But the vast majority  of them are behind the various raggle-taggle gatbandhansthat have been formed across the country to fight the BJP. This is why the exit poll predictions this time need to be taken with more than a pinch of salt.

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An awful cancer has invaded the soul of India. This is the country where Gautam Buddha,  the greatest saint humanity has known, was born. This is the country where Bhakti and Sufi  poets and saints stripped Brahminical Hinduism and orthodox Islam of ritual, idol worship and clerical control,  and preached union with the almighty through  love and submission,

This is the country of Swami Vivekananda, who electrified the World Conference of Religions at Chicago in 1893, by telling the delegates that Hinduism did not merely tolerate other religions but accepted them,   because the great religions are  like rivers that have carved out  different paths but end in the same sea; like paths up a mountain that end at the same peak.

This is the country that produced  Mahatma Gandhi, who drove  the British out of India without  firing a shot at them. But today this same country is in the grip of a blood lust in which the only issue being discussed ad nauseamis ‘how many terrorists/ Pakistanis/ Muslims did “we” kill in Balakot?

Nowhere is the new bloodlust more visible than on Indian television,  which is being watched abroad with growing horror on Youtube. A report in the Washington Posthas summed up its irresponsibility with damning precision:

“More than two weeks after the (Pulwama) attack, our analysis finds that no news site had rectified the errors in their reporting, leaving these misleading facts as a matter of public record. Instead, the Indian media has ascribed to itself the role of an amplifier of the government propaganda that took two nuclear states to the brink of war. Many TV newsrooms were transformed into caricatures of military command centers, with anchors assessing military technology and strategy (sometimes incorrectly). Some even dressed for the occasion in combat gear. Speculation and conjecture were repeated ad infinitum, and several journalists even took to Twitter to encourage the Indian army”[1].

If blame can be ascribed to any single individual, it has to be Prime minister Narendra Modi, who is willing to stop at nothing  to win the next election. But why have the media , that pride themselves on being the Fourth Estate of democracy (“The Nation wants to know”)  joined in so enthusiastically? The short answer is that the audience to whom it panders is not the India that has existed for ages, but a  new India being created mainly in the urban areas today.

That India and its proponent, the RSS, are products of modernity and the rupture it creates with the past. For this India  religion begins and ends with the robotic performance of ritual,  poojato idols, pilgrimages to Vaishno Devi and Amar Nath, and ‘purifying’ baths during the  Kumbh Mela at the confluence of  the  stinking Ganges and Yamuna rivers that they have not the slightest intention of either reviving or cleaning up.

This new India is still very small. Even in 2014, barely 31 percent of the electorate voted for Modi. So why are there no defenders of the old India out there? While many factors are responsible, in the political sphere the answer seems to lie in the cultural vacuum at the core of the Congress, the largest party in the opposition. The leader  of the Congress is a lady born in Italy and raised a Catholic. The President of the party is only one quarter Hindu by blood, and not Hindu at all by nurture or education. Neither of them has a gut  understanding of the core values of Hindu society; its syncretic, accepting, pluralism; its willingness to adapt, live and let live. So neither of them is able to  feel the anger that the  degradation of Hinduism, and  perversion of  its core values by the RSS has created in caste hindus of the old India, and the fear it has inspired in the Dalits, some of the backward classes and the Muslims.

This emotional vacuum at the top has led the Congress into the trap of trying to compete with the BJP by peddling ‘soft Hinduism’, instead of opposing  the ‘hard Hindutwa’ of the RSS, tooth and nail. Before the Gujarat elections Rahul Gandhi visited temple after temple, came out of them with a teekaon his forehead and proclaimed that “I am a Hindu” in much the same way as a convert to Islam or Christianity would proclaim that he or she is now a Muslim or Christian.

This “soft”  Hindutwa explains why he was so quick to accept Pakistan’s culpability  in the attack, why he   described it almost sentimentally as  “an attack on India’s soul” and,  without prior discussion, committed not only the Congress but the entire opposition to “fully supporting  the government and the security forces” in their actions. By doing this he legalized in advance every action that Modi has taken against Pakistan.

“Soft Hindutwa” also explains many of his subsequent silences and omissions, such as why he did not point out that Pakistan was only indirectly to blame because the suicide bomber was a Kashmiri youth; why he did not immediately condemn Modi’s dangerous brinkmanship in launching a pre-emptive attack on a Jaish-e-Mohammad madrassa and training camp  at Balakot, and why he did not immediately condemn Modi’s calculated silence  over the expulsion of thousands of Kashmiris from apartments, rooms and hostels by frenzied mobs across north India. To the minorities, as well as to the Hindus of the ‘old’ India , it conveyed the disheartening news that for the Congress too political expediency trumped the rule of law. So why bother to vote for it?

This lack of courage  has allowed Modi to turn the tables on the opposition. Whereas it is he who is playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship in a desperate effort to win an election he was almost  certain to lose,  with the help of the ever-subservient media he has been able to  portray  the opposition as unprincipled, opportunistic politicians who care two hoots about India’s security and standing in south Asia and the world, and are only intent upon ousting the BJP from power at any cost.

As a result, Modi has been able to make a significant part of the population of the country forget, at least for the moment, the collapse of the economy, the crisis in agriculture, the stagnation of industry, the  11 million jobs lost by it over the past five years, and the hollowness of  the grandiose promises he made to them when he came to power. Whether Modi  will be able to make their amnesia last till the general elections remains to be seen. But Rahul Gandhi’s silence on this front too is not going to shorten it.

Unfortunately this is not the end of India’s misfortune for, having made one major mistake, Rahul Gandhi seems intent on making another, even bigger one. This is not to understand the imperative need to avoid fracturing the anti-BJP vote at any cost. Instead through his lack of experience and his want of leadership qualities, he is doing the exact opposite: in state after state he is  allowing the shortsightedness and greed of his  party rank and file to make him demand far more seats in than the Congress’ share of the vote merits, and thereby  disrupt the building of a common front against the BJP.

In Delhi the Congress has flatly refused  to make any  seat-sharing agreement with the Aam Admi Party, and has decided to fight all the seven seats by itself, despite the fact that it does not stand a snowball in Hell’s  chance of winning even a single seat,  and can only divide the vote in favour of the BJP. This has been made abundantly clear by an opinion poll based on  a mammoth 18,750 person sample has  shown that while the AAP still holds 52 percent of the vote, the Congress share is a paltry 5.5 percent.

In the crucial state of UP the Congress has already published the names of 11 candidates and intends to fight many more seats in spite of  having won only 2 seats out of 80 in 2014 and commanding barely 11 percent of the vote. In UP  too whatever little chance the Congress had of cutting into the BJP vote to win some seats has been destroyed by its tame acceptance of Modi’s leadership in dealing with the aftermath of Pulwama. Today, all that the Congress can do is to increase the number of seats that the BJP will win.

As if these setbacks are not enough, if reports in some newspapers are accurate, relations between  the Congress and Tejaswi Yadav’s JDU are also becoming strained in Bihar.

How costly Rahul Gandhi’s immaturity , and lack of leadership qualities,  can prove was  shown by the results of the Gujarat state assembly elections in December 2017. Long before  he turned on Mani Shankar Aiyar, the most eloquent speaker in  his  own party, when Aiyar defended  the Gandhi family against an unprovoked slur by Modi  by calling him  a neech kism ka admi, (which Gandhi misunderstood as a neech jaat ka admi) ,  he had already  ensured a BJP victory by spurning the  Aam admi party as well.

Well before the election,  Arvind Kejriwal had made three attempts to contact Rahul Gandhi in order to forge an alliance with the Congress in Gujarat. Kejriwal had understood that  while the AAP could not win any seats on its own, it did command a sizeable  share of the vote in Gujarat. He was therefore willing to put up AAP candidates in seats selected by the Congress, where the AAP had the greatest capacity to cut into the BJP’s vote.  Rahul Gandhi did not even bother to reply to his a phone calls. So  BJP came back to power by the skin of its teeth, winning 18 seats with a margin of 5,000 or fewer votes and nine with a margin of less than 2,000 !

Today the Indian nation is facing a crisis whose seriousness almost no one in the Congress party understands ( and the few who do dare not to speak). Thanks to Rahul Gandhi’s inexperience and indecisiveness  there is now a distinct possibility that the BJP will emerge as the largest single party after the next elections and be able to  form a government with disillusioned elements of the Mahagatbandhan.Should that happen, the dwindling but still substantial number of Kashmiris who   want azadiwithout losing their links with India  will lose all hope and  start backing those who  want to secede from India. India will  have lost  Kashmir forever. Worse still, a future BJP government’s  attempt to hold on to it by force alone, as Modi has done for the last five years,  will almost certainly precipitate a war with Pakistan.

In the Indian heartland democrats and dissidents will be silenced through a wholesale use of the sedition laws.  First the High courts and then  the Supreme Court will collapse under the burden of the cases that the victims will file. Vigilante rule targeting Muslims and Dalits will  gather momentum. As faith in the police and the judiciary dwindles first a few, and then more  Muslim youth will  conclude that it is better to die fighting than live in fear forever, and swing to terrorism  as hundreds , if not thousands,  of Kashmiri youth have done in the past five years. The police repression that will inevitably follow will destroy the last vestiges of democracy and the rule of law.

State governments not under BJP rule will not take this lying down. Their attempts to protect their democratic systems will lead to the splintering, and then disintegration, of India. The portents of disintegration are already visible: Modi has not held a single meeting of the National Development Council since he came to power, and questioned the very need for its existence in January 2015.

And the first signs of rebellion by state governments against arbitrary rule by the Centre have already appeared. Between November 2018 and January 2019 three states – Seemandhra, West Bengal, and Chhattisgarh, have withdrawn their ‘general consent’ to Central enforcement agencies, to operate in their territory  without prior, specific permission, under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.

The portents are unambiguous: if the BJP of the Modi era (not to be confused with the BJP of the Vajpayee era)  is returned to power  it is not only its democracy but its unity, and its syncretic culture that will be in mortal danger.

[1]https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/04/after-pulwama-indian-media-proves-it-is-bjps-propaganda-machine/?utm_term=.0d1e1c5a993a

While such electoral promises may garner votes, taxpayer money meant to safeguard India’s future is instead spent on an ever-expanding web of social welfare programmes that don’t really enable the poor.

Credit: Reuters

The approach of the next general election has reminded political leaders of the existence of the poor in India. This has set off a rash of competing promises to the electorate.

On January 28, three days before the budget, Congress president Rahul Gandhi announced that his party would guarantee a minimum income to every poor family in the country.

As of now neither Rahul, nor anyone else in Congress, has clarified precisely who will benefit from this scheme, but the cost will be prohibitive: At the prevailing minimum wage of Rs 321 a day (Rs 9,630 a month), covering 25% of the families of the country will cost the exchequer a whopping Rs 700,000 crore a year.

How the beneficiaries will be chosen is still unclear. The actual number could be much smaller – perhaps no more than 18% – if we count only those whom the National Sample Survey has placed in its residual category of ‘casual’ workers. But even casual workers make up 18% of the work force. So guaranteeing at least a minimum income will add Rs 500,000 crore to the central government’s expenditures.

The situation in Wazirpur is indicative of the plight of unorganised workers across Delhi. Credit: Amit Kumar

Not to be outdone, three days later, Piyush Goel – Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s acting finance minister – announced in his budget speech that the BJP-led government would introduce an immediate income subsidy of Rs 6,000 a year to all farm families with less than two hectares of land. The government has estimated that 12 crore farmers operate on less than two hectares of land. This will therefore add Rs 72,000 crore to the Centre’s annual expenditure.

Goyal also unveiled an insurance scheme for unorganised workers in which the government will match the contributions of Rs 55 to Rs 100 a month of contributors starting from the age of 18, and guarantee them a pension of Rs 3,000 a month after they reach the age of superannuation. On the surface, this looks like a ‘pay as you go’ insurance scheme of the kind that continental European countries have adopted (but the UK and India have not). But it too bears the marks of haste and lack of study.

In ‘pay as you go’ schemes, the annual payout by the insurance company is met by the interest earned on accumulated pension contributions, supplemented by current premium inflows.

If such a scheme is open to anyone who is prepared to pay the required premium, a lock-in period of five to six years before contributors become eligible for its benefits is usually sufficient to make it solvent, without the need for any annual subvention from the exchequer.

But the imposition of a Rs 15,000 ceiling on eligibility for benefits will almost certainly pervert its purpose. For it will provide the employers with a big stick with which to dissuade workers who want a pay hike beyond Rs 15,000: “Stay below it or face the loss of half your pension when you retire”. 

Unwittingly, therefore, Goyal has made a similar mistake to what the Speenhamland Act made in England in 1795, when it promised to supplement private wages with a ‘filler’ to raise workers’ living standards to the minimum acceptable level. All that the Act succeeded in doing was to allow employers to lower their wage rates as far as the Speenhamland commissioners would tolerate .

The ‘Speenhamland Effect’ will also ensure that the total number of beneficiaries will far exceed the 10 crore that to the Modi government expects. There are more than 36 crore non-agricultural employees in the unorganised sector. Is there any good reason not to expect 30 crore among them to take out old age pension policies? 

If, or rather when, that happens, the government’s outgo on the scheme will rise to Rs 36,000 crore. If one adds to these two schemes the tax, and interest rebates that the interim finance minister has promised, this budget will increase budget spending by Rs 100-125,000 crore in a full year.

A woman tests LED bulbs after installing them onto a grid to make indicator lights inside an electrical manufacturing unit in Mumbai, March 22, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Francis Mascarenhas

A broke government

Where will this money come from? Neither the Congress nor the BJP has said a word about how it will raise it, so one must conclude that they expect the annual increase in the government’s tax and non-tax revenues to cover the extra spending. 

But even a cursory look at the government’s finances will show that while this can happen when the economy is growing at 8-10% a year and industry at 9-12%, as it did between 2003 and 2011, it cannot when industrial growth is stuck at 3-4% a year. 

The harsh truth is that the government is broke. To balance its budget in 2017-18, it had to borrow money to meet close to 29% of its expenditure by borrowing money from the public through the sale of bonds by the Reserve Bank of India. The preliminary estimate for 2018-19 is only marginally lower. 

Had the borrowed money been going into the creation of infrastructure, as it did in from the ’50s to the ‘70s, it would have given no cause for concern because the additional assets it created would have generated more money and more jobs. 

But in 2017-18, very little of the borrowing is being done for investment. Of Rs 5,91,000 crore in 2017-18, Rs 529,000 crore was used to pay the interest on past loans. This is thus a self-contained circle that comes into being in which fresh debt is incurred to meet the cost of servicing past debt.

In short, the government is running the largest Ponzi scheme of all time.

The budget does contain a small allocation Rs 263,000 crore for its capital account. But this money does not create new fixed assets. Most of it goes into the maintenance of the fixed assets – roads, bridges, power stations and the like that were built in the past. 

In sum, very little of the money that the government now raises from taxpayers is intended to safeguard the future of the country by creating more and better infrastructure. Nearly all of it is being spent upon salaries and pensions of a bloated bureaucracy whose income is adjusted every five years for inflation, come rain or shine.

What little remains is being spent on an ever-expanding web of social welfare programmes that create immediate relief and garner votes in the next election, but do nothing that will enable the poor to stand on their own feet.

That security comes only with the acquisition of stable, permanent jobs. Neither Rahul Gandhi’s minimum income programme, nor Mr Modi’s Rs 6,000 a year to the superannuated farmer will assure his or her son, daughter or grandchildren a job. To revert to economists’ jargon, every rupee that the government spends on boosting consumption instead of investment, denies someone a job on some date in the not too distant future.

https://thewire.in/politics/congress-bjp-electoral-promises

The tragedy of the crisis in West Bengal is that it pits the political freedom of regional parties against the mandate of the state to punish corruption and political pillage.

Mamata Banerjee at her dharna site in Kolkata. Credit: PTI

Seventy years after India gained its freedom, the Ashoka Chakra has become a symbol of national unity – one that every child in the country is familiar with. But there is a darker side to the unity that Ashoka created, which few care to remember.

Beginning in the 14th year of his reign, Ashoka attempted to make his subjects change their traditional customs to bring them in line with dhamma – the Buddhist ‘right path’. To oversee this, he appointed a socio-religious police, the dhamma mahamattas. Initially the dhamma mahamattas used persuasion, but as Ashoka grew more introverted later in life, they began to abuse their power and use coercion.

As the historian Romila Thapar has noted, their high-handedness created a wave of discontent. After Ashoka’s death, first the outlying and then the inner principalities began to ignore central edicts. In less than half a century, the Mauryan empire passed into history.

What happened then has been repeated many times since. It happened when Aurangzeb tried to re-establish Muslim pre-eminence in the Mughal empire and alienated the Rajput princes who supplied his army with most of its soldiers.

It happened when Achyuta Raya, the weak and self-centred son of Krishnadeva Raya, the greatest of the Vijayanagar kings, tried to hold together his father’s far-flung empire through the use of threats and force.

It almost happened to the British Raj, when Lord Dalhousie imposed the doctrine of lapse upon the princes who had entered into subsidiary alliance with the East India Company.

India is on another such fateful cusp today. Since the 1994 Bommai judgment of the Supreme Court, which practically ruled out the use of president’s rule to keep state governments in line, executive power has been shifting steadily from the Centre to the states.

Most of this shift has taken place in a spirit of cooperation, to the end of improving governance and strengthening democracy. But on February 3, that cooperation gave way to open conflict between the Central government and the state of West Bengal.

The CBI’s record in West Bengal

A fortnight earlier, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had accused the Kolkata police commissioner, Rajeev Kumar, of ‘deliberately delaying and diluting an SIT [investigation] of two notorious chit fund Ponzi schemes,’ the Sarada and Rose Valley scams. It said he was ‘absconding’, a clear warning that his arrest was imminent.

The CBI’s accusation was strongly refuted the very next morning. Javed Shamim, the additional commissioner of Kolkata police, pointed out that Kumar had been in office every day, including on weekends. Chief minister Mamata Banerjee accused the Modi government of resuming its campaign to bring the Trinamool Congress to its knees before the general election.

Mamata had good reason to believe this. In 2014, the CBI had come to Kolkata in a similar manner and arrested two Trinamool MPs, as well as the state’s minister for transport and sports, and the state director-general of police. They were subjected to intense cross-examination on charges of collusion in the chit-fund scams.

Thirty months later, on April 17, 2017, the CBI registered a first information report (FIR) against 13 persons – including 12 top Trinamool leaders – who were allegedly caught accepting cash on camera in a sting operation carried out by the news portal Narada News. The sting was carried out just before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and was made public in 2016, just days ahead of the Bengal assembly elections.

When the investigators are suspect

The West Bengal police had therefore been seething at the high-handedness of the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate for some time. So on Sunday evening, when a team of CBI officers arrived unannounced at the commissioner’s house, and asked to be let in for “official work”, the police at the bungalow asked them to wait.

Word spread through Kolkata police stations that the CBI was about to arrest their chief. In no time, the CBI officers were besieged by hundreds of state police. They had to call in the CRPF to be rescued.

Mamata went straight to the police commissioner’s bungalow, accused the CBI of being Modi’s political tools and began a dharna, claiming that this had become necessary “to save democracy, the Constitution and the country.”

Commenting on the confrontation, a senior official of the Kolkata police said, “The CBI and ED have always acted as agencies above law. There are certain rules which all agencies need to follow while investigating. If they look for cooperation from us, they too need to cooperate with us.”

Protection for new partymen

Narendra Modi’s misuse of the CBI and other agencies had also been exposed when the CBI dropped its investigations against the former Trinamool railway minister Mukul Roy, and Assam minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, after they joined the BJP in November 2017.

While the evidence then was inferential, fresh evidence seems to have emerged that both Roy and Biswas struck explicit deals with the BJP to get the West Bengal and Assam police off their backs.

In a taped conversation apparently with the BJP’s general secretary for West Bengal, Kailash Vijayvargiya, Roy is heard asking him to ‘fix’ four West Bengal police officers who were creating trouble for him. Vijayvargiya denounced the recording as a forgery, but Roy has so far only accused the police of illegally taping his conversations – stopping short of challenging their veracity.

The TMC also claims that Sudipto Sen, the promoter of the Sarada chit fund, actually wrote to the CBI office in-charge in Kolkata to complain that Himanta Biswa Sarma took Rs 3 crore from him to facilitate the spread of his chit fund in Assam, and did not keep his promise.

Assam finance minister Himanta Biswa Sarma. Credit: Twitter

Crushing the CBI’s autonomy

The conflict between Delhi and Kolkata widened into a more general conflict between the Centre and states only after the Modi government broke with all precedent and summarily removed Alok Verma from the post of CBI director in October 2018.

Verma was removed because he had locked horns with Rakesh Asthana, a “special director” chosen from the Gujarat police cadre. Asthana is known to be close to Modi, who almost certainly brought him in to be his eyes and ears in the CBI.

The sordid accusations that Verma and Asthana levelled against each other led to both being sent on leave. Verma’s place was taken by M. Nageswara Rao, whose first act as interim CBI director was to transfer 13 officials – many of whom were investigating a 2011 bribery allegation against Asthana.

A week later, the CBI cleared the former Madhya Pradesh education minister, Lakshmi Kant Sharma, of complicity in the Vyapam scandal, in which 42 persons mentioned in the police records had met accidental, or inexplicable, deaths. The CBI had also declared that there had been no conspiracy behind those deaths.

In the 77 days that followed Nageswara Rao’s appointment, and the 23 days for which he was brought back after Modi sacked Verma for good (on January 10, 2019), his decisions made it clear that the CBI would not stand in the way of Modi’s vendetta against political rivals.

Modi’s cynical vendetta Raj

Modi had already shown the lengths he would go in his sustained assault on Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi, as on Mamata and the TMC in Bengal. (And earlier, too, by threatening to expose Nitish Kumar’s sources of funds, and forcing him back into the BJP’s fold.)

In November, sensing that he might be next on the list, M. Chandrababu Naidu took the fateful step of withdrawing Andhra Pradesh’s ‘general consent’ to Central enforcement agencies, to operate in Andhra without prior, specific permission, under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.

Days later, the West Bengal government did the same. On January 11, a day after Modi sacked Verma for the second time, the newly-elected Chhattisgarh government also followed suit.

This withdrawal of permission was not unprecedented: Deve Gowda had done it in Karnataka. But this is the first time that the Central government has faced three states doing so at the same time, with others ready to follow. In this moment, the Indian state confronts the rebellion that Ashoka, Aurangzeb and the British faced in the past.

The tragic cost of banishing the CBI

The tragedy of Indian democracy today is that the opposition’s battle to protect political freedom will simultaneously destroy the little capacity the state has left to prevent and punish crime.

This is demonstrated by the timing of Andhra’s withdrawal, only days before the CBI was to spring a trap to capture a ring of central government employees who were accepting bribes for permissions and favours.

When the CBI asked for specific permission to lay the trap, and asked the state to keep its plans secret, the state home ministry instead informed its own Anti-Corruption Bureau. What followed is not clear – but rather than capturing the entire ring, the CBI could make only one arrest. Its bitterness at the failure made it go public with a detailed statement about the cause.

The banner of resistance that Mamata has raised in Bengal will shelter an entire system for siphoning money from the poorest into the pockets of politicians and their henchmen – for there are at least 60 other ponzi schemes in Bengal alone, which have collected an estimated Rs 30,000 crore from around 1.7 million investors.

As the Cobrapost exposé of the Dewan Housing and Financial Scheme has shown, non-banking financial corporations are lending tens of thousands of crores to shell companies that finance political parties, among their other “investments”, but have directors with few, if any, assets. This means nothing can be recovered from them when these companies go broke.

Nearly all the major political parties joined Mamata’s protest against Modi, and reaffirmed their determination to put up a united front against the BJP in the coming elections. If they stay united, they will push the BJP out of power.

But if they do not follow up their victory by creating an election financing system that frees parties from the need to plunder money – as happened through the Sarada scam – then they will give the BJP a powerful platform fight from in 2024. And if the BJP resumes its attempt to create a monolithic Hindu rashtra, then India’s descent into the age of the later Mughals will be swift.

https://thewire.in/politics/cbi-mamata-banerjee-narendra-modi

The Emergency may be the most controversial part of her legacy but Mrs Gandhi’s greatest contribution to India was the way she handled the economic, political and foreign policy challenges the country faced after 1966.

This article was originally published on November 19, 2017. It is being republished on November 19, 2018 to mark Indira Gandhi’s birth anniversary.

Indira Gandhi is the most controversial prime minister that India has had. A third of a century after her tragic and untimely death, an older generation of Indians remembers her mainly for India’s victory in the 1971 war, and the Emergency. Scholars have also accused her of undermining democracy by splitting the Congress in 1969, repeatedly sacking chief ministers to concentrate power in her own hands, and splitting the party a second time for the same purpose in January 1978. But the poor of India remember her for her programme of ‘Garibi Hatao’ and still call her ‘Amma’. On the foreign policy side, all of us, without exception, remember with pride the way in which she stood up to Nixon and Kissinger during the run-up to the Bangladesh war. . .

The end of the Nehruvian honeymoon

So vivid is the image we have of the later Indira that very few remember the young and unsure, woman who came to power after the sudden death of Lal Bahadur Shastri in January 1966. Even fewer, therefore, appreciate the difficult circumstances in which she did what she did and her immense contribution to stabilising the nascent India she inherited. For in January 1966, the country was in the grip of a multi-faceted crisis, and did not even know it.

The production of food grain had hit a plateau in 1961. The resulting food shortage had combined with two wars in 1962 and 1965, and the worst drought of India’s history in 1965, to generate the kind of inflation the country had never known and therefore had never dealt with. Inflation and a closed economy had landed us in a foreign exchange crisis – the first of many. Devaluing the rupee was the only way forward, and the World Bank had been urging India to do this since 1961. But the Nehru and Shastri governments had procrastinated till India had run out of time.

As if this was not enough, two wars in four years had emptied India’s coffers. And two successive droughts had brought the poor to the verge of starvation, to be saved only by PL 480 wheat from the United States.

The challenges she faced within the party were no less severe. In 1966, most people believed that Indira Gandhi had been chosen as prime minister because of her father’s charisma and because the “syndicate” believed that she would be more malleable than her seasoned opponent, Morarji Desai. But the party’s organisational leaders were also disenchanted with Nehruvian socialism. Huge sums of money had been sunk into heavy industries in the public sector that had yet to yield even a notional surplus on investment, let alone profits and dividends that could be ploughed back into growth and employment. The increasing uncertainty about finding jobs had created a rising wave of discontent among students. In mid-1966, this had turned violent.

These challenges could not be met without taking hard decisions, but the country was not aware of the need for them because it did not know that it was in a crisis. The glow of independence had not faded. The 1950s had been a honeymoon period in which almost nothing went wrong: food production grew rapidly because cultivation was extended to most of the remaining arable land in the country. Industrialisation was not hindered by foreign exchange shortages because of the sterling balances inherited from the war. Nehru had carved a niche for India on the world stage. People, therefore, trusted the government implicitly and could not imagine that the difficulties they had faced were anything more than temporary.

The first devaluation and after

Indira Gandhi’s first important decision therefore shattered this cocoon of security. In June 1966, she devalued the rupee by 57.5%. The move shocked the country and aroused bitter criticism in parliament from both Left and Right. Had it succeeded in rebalancing the economy speedily, her future economic policies might have been very different. But first, a $900 million aid package that the World Bank had promised to meet the increased cost of imports till exports picked up was held up in the US Congress. Second, India was hit by its second consecutive, and equally severe, drought in 1966. As a result, by the time the promised aid began to trickle in, prices had risen by a full 32% and neutralised the price advantage that devaluation had been intended to give to India’s exports.

Indira Gandhi taking her oath of office from President S. Radhakrishnan, 1966. Credit: YouTube

The devaluation did eventually boost India’s exports. From barely one per cent a year between 1952-53 and 1965-66, export growth jumped to 14% a year between 1968-69 and 1982-83. The Green Revolution, which had been piloted through a recalcitrant Congress by food minister C. Subramaniam, also took off in 1967. So good was the response of the economy in the years that followed that despite another drought in 1972 and a four-fold rise in oil prices the next year, India began to record balance of payments surpluses in January 1976, and continued to do so till the second oil price hike in 1979-80.

But it took two years for this recovery to begin. By then, the Congress had lost four major state assemblies and come within 10 seats of losing its majority in parliament in the 1967 general elections. This, and a pronounced leaning towards the left-wing of the party under the influence of ideologues like P.N Haksar and Mohaan Kumaramangalam, was the true reason behind the Congress split of 1969.

Who split the Congress?

Critics have accused Indira Gandhi of being an autocratic prime minister who weakened Indian democracy split, citing her splitting of the Congress in 1969 and her declaration of the Emergency in 1975 as proof. The truth is rather more complex. Space does not permit a study of the Emergency, but there is ample evidence that the 1969 split was forced upon her by the party organisation in an attempt to wrest control over economic policy

The spark that set it off was the selection of a successor to President Zakir Husain after his untimely death in 1969. The syndicate chose N. Sanjiva Reddy over the incumbent vice-president and briefly acting president, V.V Giri, and did it rather obviously without consulting Mrs. Gandhi. She had every good reason to oppose this. First, V.V Giri was already the acting president. Second, choosing Reddy broke an immensely important unwritten convention drawn from Westminster’s democracy, that like the British constitutional monarch, the Indian head of state had to be an eminent, non-political, person. V.V Giri fulfilled this requirement because, as vice-president, he had not only been far removed from current politics but was a highly respected veteran trade union leader. Sanjiva Reddy was, on the other hand, very much a practicing politician.

Morarji Desai, the Union finance minister, in conversation with John Foster Dulles, U.S. secretary of state at the time, when he met the latter in the State Department, Washington. (September, 1958). Credit: Photo Division, GOI

Despite this, Indira Gandhi first sought to avoid a showdown with the syndicate. She filed Reddy’s nomination but when Giri decided to compete as an independent, announced that she preferred an open vote. Had the syndicate agreed, there would have been no split in the party when Giri won. But by then, its members had the bit between their teeth so when Congress president S. Nijalingappa found that two-thirds of the Congress parliamentary party had declined Indira Gandhi’s implicit invitation to revolt against the organisation, he took the unprecedented step of expelling the sitting prime minister from the Congress party, nor renamed Congress (O) while Indira Gandhi’s party was called Congress (R). In the March 1971 general election, she won handily, securing 350 seats to the 51 seats won by the ‘National Democratic Front’ led by the Congress (O), Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Swatantra and socialist parties.

Over the years, many personal motives have been ascribed to Mrs. Gandhi for defying the collective will of the party organisation and refusing to resign. But history will back her because she was defending not only the primacy of the prime minister over the party but the party in parliament over the party organization. As the eminent French political scientist, Maurice Duverger, pointed out in his classic 1957 work Party Politics, these are the two fundamental principles that distinguish democratic from ideological political parties.

The birth of Bangladesh

Indira Gandhi’s determination to be a prime minister in substance and not only in form was vindicated within only days of the 1971 election, when the Bangladesh crisis erupted. Only a leader with a clear vision of India and immense national pride would have been able to resist the subtle blandishments of western leaders who wanted India to absorb the 10 million refugees from East Pakistan and let sleeping dogs lie. The members of the syndicate were all seasoned politicians, but they were, in the end, provincial leaders without this vision. It is, therefore, doubtful whether they would have remained unmoved. Indira Gandhi, by contrast, had inherited a clear-cut idea of India from her father, and developed it through her own education and experience. So she had no difficulty in giving the West a clear-cut warning of her intentions and developing a multi-pronged strategy to safeguard India’s security.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, Prime Minister of Bangladesh at Palam airport prior to latter’s departure on April 11, 1974. Credit: Photo Division, GOI

Contrary to a near-universal belief, Indira Gandhi did not have her heart set upon breaking up Pakistan from the very beginning. Confronted by a seemingly endless flow of refugees into West Bengal, Mrs. Gandhi first did her best to persuade General Yahya Khan to allow the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman to form the government in Pakistan. When she failed, she sent emissaries to all major countries, and herself went to several European capitals and to Washington, to make they put pressure on Pakistan to release Sheikh Mujib. But to insure against failure she made the army train the Mukti Bahini, and draw up contingency plans to invade East Pakistan if it became necessary. This was her second use of both stick and carrot to achieve her goal, the first having been the election of V.V Giri as president. In both cases, force was her weapon of last resort.

The Bangladesh war, and the Congress’s sweeping victory in the state elections a year later, marked the high point of Indira Gandhi’s prime ministership. The Emergency is considered the lowest. But as I have argued earlier in these columns, it was the product of her understandable, and probably justified, belief that stepping down from the prime ministership then would have left the country in even greater turmoil than it already was in. She also redeemed herself in the peoples’ eyes by resisting every exhortation to extend the Emergency and holding a fresh general election in 1977 despite the near-certain knowledge that she would lose.

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